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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs’ Answer to the Petition for Review ignores the reality 
that the Court of Appeal’s published decision holds PDX – and other 
software vendors – to a no-fault or negligence standard for 
participating in the distribution of truthful speech that falls squarely 
within the protection of the First Amendment.  The panel’s adoption 
of such a low bar to hold a software vendor liable for true speech 
distributed with its software is unprecedented and warrants review by 
this Court. 
Plaintiffs insist that the monograph that PDX’s software 
delivered to Safeway was false, although they cannot identify a single 
false statement.  Plaintiffs’ actual claim is that the monograph that 
Safeway elected to give to Mrs. Hardin lacked the warning 
information that Plaintiffs contend was necessary to protect her.   
But it is undisputed that the monograph expressly stated that it 
“is not intended to cover all possible uses, directions, precautions, 
drug interactions, or adverse effects” and “is generalized and [] not 
intended as specific medical advice.”  C.T. 131.  It also twice directed 
recipients to read the “Medication Guide.”  Id.  The Court of Appeal’s 
novel ruling – that a software vendor like PDX can be held liable 
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under a negligence or no-fault liability standard for helping to 
distribute truthful information that is not legally required, merely 
because a recipient asserts that it is incomplete – will expose a wide 
array of content providers and distributors to liability.  The panel 
clearly erred, skewing California law, in summarily rejecting PDX’s 
reliance on the First Amendment to defeat Plaintiffs’ claims.  Section 
II.A, infra. 
Plaintiffs also wrongly insist that no conflict exists between the 
panel’s decision and a decision from the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal, Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc., 187 Cal.App.4th 709 (2010).  
In Rivera, the court dismissed claims against the publisher of a 
monograph because it was neither the manufacturer of the drug nor 
the pharmacy, and so it owed no duty to the plaintiffs.  Id. at 719.  In 
contrast, the panel here held that PDX owed a duty of care to 
Plaintiffs.  The cases cannot be reconciled except by this Court.   
Nor is it true, as Plaintiffs claim, that disputed issues of fact 
preclude review.  The material factual issues are undisputed, and on 
those undisputed facts, as a matter of law, PDX owed no duty to 
Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs also largely ignore the law giving PDX the right 
to rely on the legal obligations held by Mrs. Hardin’s physician and 
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pharmacist, which required them to give her the Medication Guide 
and the warnings she claims she needed to avoid harm.  The panel’s 
decision to find a duty owed by a software vendor like PDX, merely 
for assisting in distributing information – even if the content itself 
makes clear that the information is incomplete and refers recipients to 
the source of more complete information – will reverberate across any 
number of industries that provide information to third parties.  It must 
be reversed.  Section II.B, infra. 
Plaintiffs’ Answer barely addresses the third issue raised in 
PDX’s Petition, presumably because Plaintiffs abandoned their 
products liability claim below and cannot defend the panel’s decision 
to keep that claim alive.  Plaintiffs’ claim plainly is based on PDX’s 
speech that is squarely within the protection of the First Amendment, 
because the only harm alleged flowed out of the content of the speech 
delivered using PDX’s software.  Here too, in potentially subjecting 
PDX to liability without fault for true speech delivered via a software 
program that worked exactly as intended, the panel has endorsed a 
brand new theory of liability against content distributors, without the 
careful consideration that should have preceded the adoption of such 
an unprecedented theory.  Section II.C, infra. 
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Plaintiffs’ arguments against the application of Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act also find no support in the law.  
Plaintiffs cannot deny that PDX’s conduct of modifying its software at 
Safeway’s request to allow Safeway to print five-section, rather than 
eight-section, monographs, falls squarely within the broad protection 
provided by Section 230.  The Court of Appeal’s decision contradicts 
settled law on this issue and should be reversed.  Section III, infra. 
Plaintiff’s Answer to the Petition for Review seeks to distract 
from these dispositive issues.  It grossly understates the scope of the 
Court of Appeal’s published decision – including its recognition of 
two entirely new theories of liability against distributors of content 
and software providers – in claiming that the Court of Appeal’s 
published decision will have limited reach.  Ans. 3-4.  In the end, 
Plaintiff’s failure to defend so many aspects of the Court’s decision 
only underscores the fact that the panel’s decision is contrary to well-
established law, and this Court’s review is necessary to “secure 
uniformity of decision” and “settle [] important question[s] of law.”  
Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(b). 
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II. REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED ON ALL OF 
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR REVIEW 
A. The Court of Appeal Rejected PDX’s First Amendment 
Argument on the Merits, and that Issue Properly Is 
Presented for Review. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claim, the primary issue presented for 
review – whether the First Amendment protects PDX in its role in the 
distribution of consumer product information – squarely was 
addressed in the Court of Appeal, and that Court rejected PDX’s 
argument on the merits.  Ans. 17; see Opinion (“Op.”) 13.  Plaintiffs 
ignore most of PDX’s arguments (Pet. 18-23), effectively conceding 
that the panel’s decision subjecting PDX to liability is directly 
contrary to each of the cases that PDX cites.  Review should be 
granted for this reason alone. 
Instead of directly responding to PDX’s arguments, Plaintiffs 
accuse PDX of “a material factual misstatement” in PDX’s claim that 
the speech distributed in the monograph was true.  Ans. 15.  They 
claim that the monograph’s omission of the black box warning 
constituted an actionable misrepresentation.  Id.  But Plaintiffs do not 
explain how this omission could possibly be construed as a 
misrepresentation, given that the monograph explicitly states that it is 
incomplete and refers patients to the Medication Guide for complete 
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information.  Pet. 15.1  Plainly, the monograph did not purport to 
provide complete information to Plaintiffs. 
Regardless, Plaintiffs cite no case to support their claim that 
PDX can be held liable for allegedly modifying its software, at 
Safeway’s request, to omit information from the monograph, because 
no case supports them.  Their argument confuses the law governing 
fraud claims with the very different law under the First Amendment.  
In Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037-1038 (9th Cir. 
1991), for example, the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the idea that a 
book publisher could be held liable for harm allegedly sustained due 
to incomplete information in the book, explaining that “[w]ere we 
tempted to create this duty, the gentle tug of the First Amendment and 
the values embodied therein would remind us of the social costs.”   
As a matter of law, PDX cannot be held liable merely because 
the monograph delivered using its software allegedly was incomplete 
                                           
1 As Plaintiffs cannot deny, the monograph prominently states 
that it is “Important to read the Medication Guide before use.”  C.T. 
131 (Item 2, left side of page).  It also states, in the second paragraph, 
“This medicine has a MEDICATION GUIDE approved by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration.  Read it carefully.”  Id. (second 
sentence in “HOW TO USE THIS MEDICINE” paragraph).  Finally, 
it concludes with the warning that it is incomplete, generalized and 
“not intended as specific medical advice.”  Id. (final paragraph).   
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– particularly where it expressly made clear that that it was 
incomplete.  This Court should grant review to ensure that software 
providers such as PDX, and other content distributors and providers, 
are not subjected to unprecedented liability for merely distributing 
truthful information about a subject, where a plaintiff contends that 
the speaker did not provide all of the information that the plaintiff 
would have liked.2  Permitting liability on these facts exposes content 
distributors and providers to brand new liability, and will chill speech. 
B. The Panel Created A Direct Conflict in the Law on the Issue 
of Whether a Duty Exists to Provide Comprehensive 
Information in Publications Such as Drug Monographs.  
Plaintiffs invoke the factual differences between this case and 
Rivera to insist that the cases are distinguishable.  Ans. 3.  But here 
too, they ignore the issue presented in the Petition – whether a duty 
exists to provide comprehensive information in publications like the 
drug monographs at issue in this case and Rivera.  This is a question 
of law, to be resolved by the court in consideration of the category of 
allegedly negligent conduct – and not the particular facts of the case.  
                                           
2 Plaintiffs incorrectly claim that PDX failed to raise this issue 
in the Court of Appeal.  Ans. 16.  In response to arguments Plaintiffs 
made in their Answer Brief on appeal, PDX expressly argued that the 
First Amendment bars negligence claims based on the content of 
publications.  PDX Reply on appeal at 44. 
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Pet. 37 (citing Ludwig v. City of San Diego, 65 Cal.App.4th 1105, 
1111 (1998)).  By not addressing the question that PDX has asked the 
Court to review – indeed, not even mentioning the several monograph 
cases that PDX cites (see Pet. 22 n.2, 31) – Plaintiffs essentially 
concede that the Court of Appeal’s decision on this issue also is 
contrary to well-established law. 
Plaintiffs also try to muddy the waters by arguing that disputed 
issues of fact should preclude this Court’s review.  But again, their 
arguments only highlight the need for review.  Plaintiffs’ ongoing 
reliance on an Action Plan adopted pursuant to Pub.L. No. 104-180 
(August 6, 1996), 110 Stat. 1593 – and their suggestion that it imposes 
a binding obligation on PDX and distributors of consumer medication 
information – is wrong as a matter of law.  Ans. 5-6; see Pet. 12-13, 
35 n.5.  Tellingly, Plaintiffs have not cited any requirement that drug 
monographs include black box warnings – or any particular content – 
because there is no such mandate.  As PDX explains in its Petition for 
Review – and Plaintiffs cannot refute – the Action Plan provides non-
binding guidelines.  C.T. 771, 789, 791, 797-798 (Action Plan is 
voluntary).  PDX cannot be held liable for doing something that it is 
not legally required to do, yet this is the faulty premise on which the 
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Court of Appeal’s duty analysis is premised. 
Plaintiffs also pay little heed to the undisputed fact that Mrs. 
Hardin’s physician and pharmacist were legally required to give her 
the warnings that she claims she needed to avoid harm.  21 C.F.R. 
§§ 201, 208.3  This does not merely go to the care with which PDX 
carried out its alleged undertaking, as the Court found and Plaintiffs 
contend.  Ans. 19.  Rather, it establishes that PDX did not assume any 
duty to Plaintiffs, as a matter of law. 
As PDX explains in its Petition – and Plaintiffs largely ignore – 
given the independent legal obligation held by Plaintiff’s physician 
and pharmacist, PDX did not assume a duty to Plaintiffs for three 
independent reasons:  (1) PDX’s undertaking was limited to providing 
                                           
3 Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves recognize that the duty they seek 
to impose on PDX actually was held by Mrs. Hardin’s pharmacist at 
Safeway.  The Petition for Review that Plaintiffs filed the same day as 
PDX filed the instant Petition for Review, Case No. 220252, explains 
that review should be granted in that case because “[a]s a result of the 
appellate decisions in this case, the software company, PDX, Inc., 
may be held liable for its alleged negligence in modifying its software 
(at the request of Safeway, Inc.) to produce only abbreviated drug 
monographs.  Safeway, Inc., however, may not be held liable for its 
own similar conduct, namely using PDX’s software that it knew and 
intended would produce monographs that omitted drug warnings for 
all of its pharmacy customers nationwide.”  Safeway Pet. at 5.  
Plainly, Plaintiffs agree that any duty to warn that was owed to them 
was owed by Safeway. 
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software that would distribute a monograph to supplement advice 
from Plaintiff’s physician and any medication guide required by the 
FDA, and PDX never undertook to provide a comprehensive warning 
(Pet. 29-36); (2) Plaintiffs’ injuries were not foreseeable because 
Plaintiff’s physician and pharmacist were legally required to give her 
the very warnings she claims she needed (and that PDX allegedly 
failed to provide) (Pet. 36-38); and, (3) PDX was entitled to rely on 
Plaintiff’s pharmacist’s legal obligation to provide a warning to 
Plaintiff (Pet. 38-41).   
The Court of Appeal’s opinion newly creates liability for 
companies involved in the distribution of speech where none existed 
before.  Before this decision, courts carefully distinguished based on 
the undertaking actually assumed.  A speaker might be held liable if it 
expressly assumed a duty of care to readers, for example, by 
providing a guarantee regarding a product being reviewed.  E.g., 
Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal.App.2d 680 (1969).  In contrast, if 
a speaker merely discussed a topic, without providing any 
commitment about the product’s quality or safety, courts consistently 
rejected liability.  E.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 
(9th Cir. 1991).  This careful balance – which is required by the First 
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Amendment – did not prevail here.  The Court of Appeal has, for the 
first time to PDX’s knowledge, found a duty of care without any 
express undertaking or commitment.  The Court’s flawed analysis 
opens the door to liability for a wide array of speakers and companies 
that support distribution of truthful speech.  It is a dangerous 
precedent, and should be reversed. 
C. The Court of Appeal’s Refusal to Strike Plaintiffs’ Products 
Liability Claim Is Unprecedented, and Will Subject Content 
Providers to Liability Without Fault. 
Plaintiffs barely mention the Court of Appeal’s unprecedented 
ruling that PDX can be held liable on a products liability theory for 
harm allegedly caused by a product that PDX does not manufacture or 
distribute, solely because its software distributed truthful information 
about that product, which Plaintiffs allege was incomplete.  Ans. 20; 
see Pet. 41-45.  PDX is aware of no case permitting no fault liability 
for speech protected by the First Amendment, and neither Plaintiffs 
nor the panel cite such a case. 
Despite the unprecedented specter of the Court of Appeal’s 
imposition of no-fault liability against a company involved in the 
distribution of truthful information that someone else authored, 
Plaintiffs’ only response is that their products liability claim should 
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not be resolved on an anti-SLAPP motion because PDX’s motion was 
presented at an early stage of the litigation.  Ans. 20.  That argument 
turns the anti-SLAPP statute on its head.   
The anti-SLAPP statute is designed to weed out meritless 
lawsuits early in the case, to ensure that defendants such as PDX are 
not dragged through litigation on claims that plaintiffs cannot 
substantiate.  See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a); see, e.g., Briggs v. 
Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1121-1123 
(1999).  Plaintiffs bore the burden of stating and substantiating a 
legally sufficient claim.  Id. at 1123 (citations omitted); see also Taus 
v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 713-714 (2007); Navellier v. Sletten, 106 
Cal.App.4th 763, 776 (2003).  If Plaintiffs needed discovery to meet 
their burden, they were required to ask permission to conduct 
discovery before the hearing on the motion.  Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 425.16(g).  They did not. 
Plaintiffs cannot escape their failure to meet their burden by the 
blithe claim that they should be allowed to conduct discovery now to 
support their products liability claim.  Opening this door – exposing 
software providers to liability without fault where the software 
worked exactly as intended – is unprecedented.  This is particularly 
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true because for the first time under California law, truthful speech 
that is distributed through software is now subject to no fault products 
liability.  This Court should grant review and ensure that the Court of 
Appeal’s poorly-reasoned decision does not become the law in 
California, or anywhere else. 
D. The Court of Appeal’s Misapplication of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act Will Create Confusion and 
Discord in Application of that Statute. 
Plaintiffs claim that the immunity provided by Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act does not apply here because Mrs. 
Hardin received the monograph in hard copy from her pharmacy, not 
by accessing a website.  Ans. 21.  But it is irrelevant how a plaintiff 
ultimately obtains the information.  Rather, Section 230 immunity 
turns on whether (1) the defendant provides or uses an “interactive 
computer service,” (2) the claim treats the defendant as the “publisher 
or speaker” of content, and (3) that content is provided “by another 
information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  See Pet. 46. 
All of these elements are satisfied here.  PDX provides and uses 
an interactive computer service because its software facilitates access 
by Safeway to Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. (“WKH”) monographs, 
through a server.  C.T. 38-39.  Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the 
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content of the monograph, meaning they treat PDX as its publisher.  
Finally, PDX obtained the monograph content from WKH – who 
exclusively authored and updated the content of the monographs that 
Safeway gave to its customers.  As set forth in the Petition for 
Review, the fact that PDX altered its software so that Safeway would 
only receive five section monographs, at Safeway’s request, does not 
transform it into the provider of the content.  See Pet. 48-49. 
Plaintiffs posit that under PDX’s interpretation, “the seller of a 
physical product that used an ‘interactive computer service’ to create 
the paper label could avoid the traditional seller’s product liability for 
failure to warn,” Ans. 21, but this hypothetical compares apples to 
oranges.  In selling a physical product, the seller is not acting as the 
provider or user of an interactive computer service and is therefore 
entirely outside the scope of Section 230 immunity.  Thus, in this 
case, Safeway, in printing the monograph and supplying it to Mrs. 
Hardin, is not a provider or user of an interactive computer service; 
Safeway has no Section 230 defense     
Plaintiffs’ second hypothetical is similarly flawed.  Plaintiffs 
suggest that under PDX’s view, “a publisher could download 
defamatory information … print it in a newspaper and deliver it to 
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newsstands.”  Ans. 21.  But again, the publisher of a newspaper is not 
acting as the provider or user of an interactive computer service when 
it publishes a print publication.  So, too, Safeway here is not entitled 
to Section 230 immunity merely because it obtained the monograph 
content through an interactive computer service. 
In contrast, in both hypotheticals, the interactive computer 
service itself (that is, the service from whom the seller and newspaper, 
respectively, obtained the information) may be entitled to Section 230 
immunity if that information originated with a third party.  This is 
exactly what happened here.  The monograph content was exclusively 
supplied by WKH and shortened at Safeway’s request by PDX, and 
thus PDX was not the “information content provider” for any of the 
allegedly unlawful content.  It is therefore entitled to immunity.  See 
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 831 (2002) (rejecting 
attempt to hold eBay liable for representations as to authenticity of 
physical goods supplied by third parties; imposing liability would be 
“treating [eBay] as the publisher, viz., the original communicator, 
contrary to Congress’s expressed intent under section 230(c)(1) and 
(e)(3).”). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal’s published decision opens the door to a 
wide array of litigation, imposing a startling burden on companies that 
facilitate the distribution of speech protected by the First Amendment.  
Its breadth inevitably will chill speech – not only by software 
providers such as PDX, but by any content distributor or provider that 
discusses a product that might cause harm.  It skews established 
California law, and should be reversed. 
PDX therefore respectfully requests that this Court grant review 
of each of the Issues presented in the Petition for Review and, on 
review, reverse the decision by the Court of Appeal, and enter an 
Order directing the trial court to grant PDX’s Special Motion to Strike 
under California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted this ____ day of August, 2014 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
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